

TITLE OF THE INVENTION

ENCRYPTION METHOD, DECRYPTION METHOD,
CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION METHOD
AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC COMMUNICATION SYSTEM

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BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

The present invention relates to an encryption method of the public-key cryptosystem for encrypting a plaintext into a ciphertext using a public key, a decryption method of decrypting a ciphertext generated by the encryption method into a plaintext, a cryptographic communication method and a cryptographic communication system using these encryption method and decryption method, and a memory product/data signal embodied in carrier wave for recording/transmitting an operation program of the encryption method.

In the modern society, called a highly information-oriented society, based on a computer network, important business documents and image information are transmitted and communicated in a form of electronic information. Such electronic information can be easily copied, so that it tends to be difficult to discriminate its copy and original from each other, thus bringing about an important issue of data integrity. In particular, it is indispensable for establishment of a highly information oriented society to implement such a computer network that meets the factors of "sharing of computer resources, " "multi-accessing, " and

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"globalization, " which however includes various factors contradicting the problem of data integrity among the parties concerned. In an attempt to eliminate those contradictions, encrypting technologies which have been mainly used in the past 5 military and diplomatic fields in the human history are attracting world attention as an effective method for that purpose.

A cipher communication is defined as exchanging information in such a manner that no one other than the parties concerned can understand the meaning of the information. In the 10 field of the cipher communication, encryption is defined as converting an original text (plaintext) that can be understood by anyone into a text (ciphertext) that cannot be understood by the third party and decryption is defined as restoring a ciphertext into a plaintext, and cryptosystem is defined as the overall processes 15 covering both encryption and decryption. The encrypting and decrypting processes use secret information called an encryption key and a decryption key, respectively. Since the secret decryption key is necessary in decryption, only those knowing this decryption key can decrypt ciphertexts, thus maintaining data security.

20 The encryption scheme is roughly classified into two types: common-key cryptosystem and public-key cryptosystem. In a common-key cryptosystem, an encryption key and a decryption key are identical with each other, and a sender and a recipient perform cryptographic communications by possessing an identical common 25 key. The sender encrypts a plaintext based on a secret common

key and transmits the resultant ciphertext to the recipient, and then the recipient decrypts the ciphertext into the original plaintext by using this common key.

On the other hand, in a public-key cryptosystem, an
5 encryption key and a decryption key are different from each other, and cryptographic communications are performed by encrypting a plaintext by the sender with the use of a publicized public key of the recipient and decrypting the resultant ciphertext by the recipient with the use of its own secret key. The public key is a key used for
10 encryption and the secret key is a key used for decrypting the ciphertext transformed by the public key, and the ciphertext transformed by the public key can be decrypted only by the secret key.

As a scheme of public-key cryptosystem, a product-sum type
15 cryptoscheme has been known. In this cryptosystem, an entity of sender generates a ciphertext $C = m_1 c_1 + m_2 c_2 + \dots + m_K c_K$ by using both a plaintext vector $m = (m_1, m_2, \dots, m_K)$ obtained by dividing a plaintext into K parts and a base vector $c = (c_1, c_2, \dots, c_K)$ as public key. The other entity of recipient decrypts the ciphertext C into
20 the plaintext vector m by using a secret key thereby to obtain the original plaintext. Prior art product-sum type cryptoschemes use an operation on an integer ring.

With regard to such a product-sum type cryptography, various new cryptoschemes have been proposed and investigated
25 from the viewpoint of security improvement, process time speedup,

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and the like.

Nevertheless, such a product-sum type cryptography, by nature, has a feature of being easily attacked by using a mathematical LLL (Lenstra·Lenstra·Lovasz) algorithm which

5 decrypts each component of a plaintext vector m from each component of a base vector c made public. Thus, the development of a product-sum type encryption method resistive to attacks by the LLL algorithm has been desired.

10 BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

An object of the present invention is to provide a product-sum type encryption method of new scheme resistive to attacks by LLL algorithm because of constituting a cryptosystem on a finite field, thereby improving the security.

15 Another object of the present invention is to provide a decryption method of decrypting a ciphertext generated by the above-mentioned encryption method into a plaintext, a cryptographic communication method and a cryptographic communication system using the above-mentioned encryption

20 method and decryption method, and a memory product/data signal embodied in carrier wave for recording/transmitting an operation program of the encryption method.

In a first aspect of the present invention, secret keys, public keys, random numbers, and the like are expressed in a polynomial 25 representation, whereby a product-sum type cryptosystem is

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constituted on a finite field instead of an integer ring. As a result, the cryptosystem is more resistive to attacks by LLL algorithm than a product-sum type cryptosystem on an integer ring, thereby improving the security.

5 In a second aspect of the present invention, each term of intermediate decrypted text is constituted of an error correcting code word, whereby the original plaintext can be reproduced accurately by the correction capability of the code word even if an error of a certain extent occurs.

10 In a third aspect of the present invention, a plurality of public keys are previously prepared for each of divided plaintexts obtained by dividing a plaintext. For each of the divided plaintexts, an arbitrary public key is selected from among the prepared plurality of public keys, whereby a ciphertext is generated by using 15 the selected public keys. As such, public keys are selective, that is, an entity of sender can arbitrarily select the public keys to generate a ciphertext. Accordingly, the manner of the public key selection is unknown to attackers, which makes attacks difficult thereby to improve the security further.

20 The above and further objects and features of the present invention will more fully be apparent from the following detailed description with accompanying drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE SEVERAL VIEWS OF THE

25 DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing a situation of informational communication between two entities in accordance with a first embodiment;

FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a public key list in a database of 5 a first example of the first embodiment;

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a public key list in a database of a second example of the first embodiment;

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing a situation of informational communication between two entities in accordance 10 with a second embodiment; and

FIG. 5 is a diagram showing the configuration of an embodiment of a memory product.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

15 The embodiments of the present invention are described below in detail.

First, the polynomial representation in the present invention is explained. The m shown in the following (1) represents a message generated by encoding a plaintext M for the purpose of 20 class selection information in the first embodiment described later or error correction detection in the second embodiment described later. Here, K is the number of division of the plaintext M .

$$m = (m_1, m_2, \dots, m_K) \quad \dots(1)$$

Although each component m_i ($i = 1, 2, \dots, K$) of the message m is a 25 k_i -dimensional vector on a finite field (Galois field) F_q , an

assumption is made herein such that $q=2$ and $k_i=k$ (constant), for the simplicity of description.

As such, the message m is previously encoded. In order to emphasize this fact, each component m_i of the message m is

5 rewritten into m'_i , and the m'_i is expressed by the following (2) with $m'_i \in F_2$. Further, the component m_i is expressed by the following (3) in a polynomial representation.

$$m'_i = (m'_{i1}, m'_{i2}, \dots, m'_{ik}) \quad \dots \quad (2)$$

$$m'_i(X) = m'_{i1} + m'_{i2} X + \dots + m'_{ik} X^{k-1} \quad \dots \quad (3)$$

10 Meanwhile, a value A is expressed by a vector s or a polynomial $s(X)$ herein, and the vector s and the polynomial $s(X)$ are referred to as a vector representation and a polynomial representation of A , respectively.

15 (First embodiment: arbitrary selection of public keys in a product-sum type cryptosystem on a finite field)

FIG. 1 is a schematic diagram showing a situation that an encryption method/decryption method in accordance with the first embodiment is used in an informational communication between two entities a , b . In the example of FIG. 1, an entity a encrypts a 20 plaintext M into a ciphertext C , thereby transmitting the ciphertext C through a communication channel 1 to the other entity b . The entity b decrypts the ciphertext C into the original plaintext M .

The entity a of sender comprises: a plaintext divider 2 for dividing a plaintext M into a plurality of divided plaintexts; a 25 public key selector 5 for selecting a public key for each divided

plaintext from a database 10; and an encryptor 3 for generating a ciphertext C using the selected public keys and divided plaintexts. On the other hand, the entity b of recipient comprises a decryptor 4 for decrypting the transmitted ciphertext C into the original
5 plaintext M. In the first embodiment, secret keys, public keys, random numbers, and the like are expressed in a polynomial representation as described later, whereby a product-sum type cryptosystem is constituted on a finite field.

[First example of the first embodiment]

10 FIG. 2 is a diagram showing a public key list (base list) in the database 10 previously storing a plurality of public keys for each divided plaintext. In FIG. 2, K is the number of division (number of classes) of a plaintext M, and J is the total number of the public keys (bases) of selection objectives for each class i ($i = 1, 2, \dots, K$). J
15 public keys (bases) are prepared for each divided plaintext (each class) except for the class 1.

The entity a of sender arbitrarily selects and reads out a key (base) for each divided plaintext (each class) from the database 10 storing such public keys (bases), and then uses the read-out K
20 public keys (bases) as encryption keys. Here, the number of the possible selection combinations of public keys (bases) allowed for the entity a is J^{K-1} . The existence of the J^{K-1} combinations of public keys (bases) provides grounds for the further security of the first embodiment, in addition to the constitution on a finite field.

25 (Preparation)

Some symbols are defined as follows.

m_i : component of message m ; $m_i \in F_q$ ($q=2^k$)

α_i, β_i : random numbers; $\alpha_i, \beta_i \in F_q$

v_i : random number vector on F_q belonging to class i of public

5 key list

b_i : base $b_i = \alpha_i + \beta_i X$

(Encryption)

Secret keys and public keys are prepared as follows.

• Secret keys: $\{b_i(X)\}, \{v_i(X)\}, w(X), P(X)$, permutation matrix

10 $P(*)$

• Public keys: $\{c_i^{(j)}(X)\}, F_q$

With $P(X)$ being an appropriately selected, secret irreducible polynomial, the following (4) is deduced.

15

$$b_1(X) b_2(X) \cdots b_i(X) v_{i+1}^{(j)}(X) w(X) \\ \equiv c_i^{(j)}(X) \pmod{P(X)} \quad \cdots (4)$$

The polynomial representation $b_1(X) b_2(X) \cdots b_{i-1}(X) v_i(X)$ of the plurality of public keys of selection objectives shown in FIG. 2 corresponds to a vector representation $b_1 b_2 \cdots b_{i-1} v_i$.

20

Encryption is carried out on F_q as shown in the following (5).

$$C(X) = \sum_{i=1}^k m_i c_i^{(j)}(X) \quad \cdots (5)$$

(Decryption)

By using a secret polynomial $w^{-1}(X)$ satisfying the following

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(6), an intermediate decrypted text $M(X) \equiv C(X) w^{-1}(X) \pmod{P(X)}$

$P(X)$ is deduced as shown in the following (7) with $i \leq j \leq J$.

$$w(X)w^{-1}(X) \equiv 1 \pmod{P(X)} \quad \dots (6)$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 & C(X)w^{-1}(X) \\
 & \equiv m'_1 v_1(X) + m'_2 b_1(X) v_2^{(j)}(X) + \dots \\
 & \quad + m'_K b_1(X) b_2(X) \dots b_{K-1}(X) v_K^{(j)}(X) \pmod{P(X)} \\
 & \quad \dots \quad (7)
 \end{aligned}$$

After the lowest order term $m'_1 v_1(X)$ of the intermediate decrypted text $M(X)$ is decrypted, the subsequent terms can be decrypted similarly.

By using the inverse element $v_1^{-1}(X)$ of $v_1(X)$ modulo $b_1(X)$, the following (8) is deduced. Here, as shown in FIG. 2, the base $(v_1(X))$ is uniquely selected in the class 1.

$$M(X)v_1(X)v_1^{-1}(X) \equiv m'_1 \pmod{b_1(X)} \quad \dots (8)$$

The encoded component m'_1 of the original plaintext is decoded from m'_1 , and the selection information of base (public key) in the class 2 is decrypted according to the following (9).

$$m'_1 \equiv j \pmod{J} \quad \dots (9)$$

Thus, the selected base (public key $b_1(X) v_2^{(j)}(X)$) in the class 2 is specified, therefore, m'_2 can be decrypted in the same manner as that for m'_1 . That is, the m'_2 is decrypted according to the following (10). The m'_3 to m'_K are decrypted similarly.

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \frac{M(X) - m'_1 v_1(X)}{b_1(X)} \\
 &= m'_2 v_2^{(j)}(X) + m'_3 b_2(X) v_3^{(j)}(X) \\
 &+ \cdots + m'_K b_2(X) \cdots b_{K-1}(X) v_K^{(j)}(X) \quad \cdots \quad (10)
 \end{aligned}$$

5

As such, the description of the first example has been made for the case that the lowest order term of message of a product-sum type ciphertext is first decrypted and that the higher order terms of message are then sequentially decrypted. However, the process 10 may be reversed such that the highest order term of message is first decrypted and that the lower order terms of message are then sequentially decrypted.

[Second example of the first embodiment]

FIG. 3 is a diagram showing a public key list (base list) in 15 the database 10 previously storing a plurality of public keys for each divided plaintext. In FIG. 3, K is the number of division (number of classes) of a plaintext M, and J is the total number of the public keys (bases) of selection objectives for each class i ($i = 1, 2, \dots, K-2$). J public keys (bases) are prepared for each divided plaintext (each 20 class) except for the $(K-1)$ -th and the K-th class.

The entity a of sender arbitrarily selects and reads out a key (base) for each divided plaintext (each class) from the database 10 storing such public keys (bases), and then uses the read-out K public keys (bases) as encryption keys. Here, the number of the 25 possible selection combinations of public keys (bases) allowed for

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the entity a is J^{K-2} .

(Preparation)

Some symbols are defined as follows.

m_i' : component of message m ; $m_i' \in F_q$ ($q=2^k$)

5 $\alpha_i^{(j)}, \beta_i^{(j)}$: random numbers; $\alpha_i^{(j)}, \beta_i^{(j)} \in F_q$

b_i : base $b_i^{(j)}(X) = \alpha_i^{(j)} + \beta_i^{(j)} X$

(Encryption)

Secret keys and public keys are prepared as follows.

• Secret keys: $\{b_i(X)\}, w(X), P(X)$, permutation matrix $P(*)$

10 • Public keys: $\{c_i^{(j)}(X)\}, F_q$

With $P(X)$ being an appropriately selected, secret irreducible polynomial, the following (11) is deduced.

$$b_i^{(j)}(X)w(X)X^{i-1} \equiv c_i^{(j)}(X) \pmod{P(X)} \quad \dots (11)$$

15 Here, the components of vector $c_i^{(j)}$ are randomly located by the secret permutation matrix $P(*)$. In FIG. 3, a vector representation of $b_i^{(j)}(X)$ is expressed by $b_i^{(j)}$. The reason why only one base is used in the classes $K-1, K$ as described above in FIG. 3 is to achieve a high-speed decryption as described later.

20 Encryption is carried out on F_q as shown in the following (12).

$$C(X) = \sum_{i=1}^K m_i' c_i^{(j)}(X) \quad \dots (12)$$

(Decryption)

25 By using a secret polynomial $w^{-1}(X)$ satisfying the following

(13), an intermediate decrypted text $M(X) \equiv C(X) w^{-1}(X) \pmod{P(X)}$ is deduced as shown in the following (14) with $i \leq j \leq J$.

$$w(X) w^{-1}(X) \equiv 1 \pmod{P(X)} \quad \dots (13)$$

5 $C(X) w^{-1}(X)$
 $\equiv m'_1 b_1^{(j)}(X) + m'_2 b_2^{(j)}(X) X + \dots$
 $+ m'_K b_K(X) X^{K-1} \pmod{P(X)} \dots (14)$

When the highest order term m_K' of the intermediate
10 decrypted text $M(X)$ is decrypted, the second highest order term m_{K-1}' to the lowest order term m_1' can be decrypted similarly. Thus, the description herein is made below by focusing on the decryption of m_K' .

Let $S^i(M)$ generally indicate the operation of sampling the
15 2k digits corresponding to the bases $b_{i-1}^{(j)}, b_i^{(j)}$ of a vector M , and let the sampled series be expressed by a polynomial $S_M^i(X)$. The series $S_M^K(X)$ generated by sampling the highest 2k digits of the intermediate decrypted text $M(X)$ given by equation (14) is obtained by the following (15). Here, $e_{K-1}(X)$ is a polynomial representation
20 of the highest k digits of the second highest term $m_{K-1}'(X) b_{K-1}(X)$.

$$S_M^K(X) = m'_K(X) b_K(X) + e_{K-1}(X) \dots (15)$$

The above-mentioned $e_{K-1}(X)$ is generally called a postfix.
The $e_{K-1}(X)$ can be deduced according to the following (16),
25 whereby the message $m_K'(X)$ can be decrypted according to the

following (17).

$$S_M^K(X) \equiv e_{K-1}(X) \pmod{b_K(X)} \dots \quad (16)$$

5
$$\frac{S_M^K(X) - e_{K-1}(X)}{b_K(X)} = m_K'(X) \dots \quad (17)$$

As shown in FIG. 3, there is no room for selection in the classes $K-1, K$, then the b_{K-1}, b_K are uniquely selected in respective classes. While the original information m_K is decrypted 10 from m_K' , the selection information of base in the class $K-2$ is decrypted according to the following (18). More generally, the selection information of base in the class $i-2$ is obtained using $m_i' \equiv j \pmod{J}$.

$$m_K' \equiv j \pmod{J} \quad \dots \quad (18)$$

15 As such, the base selection information of the second next class is decrypted. The purpose of this is to prepare the base $b_{i-2}^{(j)}$ before entering the encryption of $S_{M^{i-2}}(M)$ given for the class $i-2$. As a result, the decryption process can be sequentially performed without delay.

20 The form of the base $b_{K-2}^{(j)}$ in the class $K-2$ is specified according to $m_K' \equiv j \pmod{J}$, therefore, m_{K-2}' can be decrypted in the same manner as that for m_K' . Further, by rewriting m_{K-1}' as shown in the following (19), the m_{K-1}' can be decrypted in the same manner as that for m_K' . The m_i' to m_{K-2}' can be decrypted 25 sequentially in descending order by the similar process.

$$M^{K-1}(X) = M^K(X) + m'_K(X) b_K(X) X^{K-1} \dots \quad (19)$$

In the above-mentioned first example, the decryption process of message and the decryption process of base selection information 5 can not be performed in parallel. In contrast, in the second example, the base selection information of class $i-2$ can be obtained during the decryption of the i -th message, that is, the decryption process of message and the decryption process of base selection information can be performed in parallel. More specifically, the 10 operation of the above-mentioned (16) in the i -th class and the operation of the above-mentioned (17) in the $(i-1)$ -th class can be performed in parallel. This is what is called a pipeline processing, which permits a much higher-speed decryption processing in the second example than in the first example.

15 The description of the second example has been made for the case that the highest order term of message of a product-sum type ciphertext is first decrypted and that the lower order terms of message are then sequentially decrypted. However, the process may be reversed such that the lowest order term of message is first 20 decrypted and that the higher order terms of message are then sequentially decrypted.

Next, the security in the first embodiment described above is explained. The j -th public key $c_i^{(j)}(X)$ in the class i is expressed by the following (20).

$$25 \quad c_i^{(j)}(X) = c_{i1}^{(j)} + c_{i2}^{(j)} X + \dots + c_{iK}^{(j)} X^{K-1} \dots \quad (20)$$

Observing that the message m_i in the class i is involved into a product independently of each coefficient of the polynomial expressed by the above-mentioned (20), the vector $(c_{i1}^{(j)}, c_{i2}^{(j)}, \dots, c_{iK}^{(j)})$

5 on F_q corresponding to the coefficient of the polynomial of the above-mentioned (20) can be randomly scrambled in an appropriate order known to the recipient alone but by a permutation common to each class. Thus, the designer can save the permutation matrix P^* as a secret key. Accordingly, number-theoretical attacks to

10 the public information is practically impossible for $K \geq 30$ or so. For example, in the case that $k=16$ for the k in F_q with $q=2^k$ and that $K=32$, the total number of trials necessary to obtain the correct order is appropriately 2.6×10^{35} .

Let a vector representation of a ciphertext C be the following

15 (21), where each component thereof is set as the following (22).

$$C = (C_1, C_2, \dots, C_K) \quad \dots (21)$$

$$C_i = \sum_{t=1}^K m_i c_{it}^{(j)} \quad \dots (22)$$

20 Here, observing that $C_i, m_i, c_{it}^{(j)} \in F_q$, an attack by LLL algorithm is difficult to apply to the above-mentioned (22). Here, $J \geq 2$ is necessary because, otherwise, the above-mentioned (22) is decrypted self-evidently by a simple linear transformation. The number of the random selections of public keys is J^{K-1} (first

25 example) and J^{K-2} (second example); thus, $J^{K-1} \gg 1$ and $J^{K-2} \gg 1$ are

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possible. Accordingly, an attack to a public-key cryptography in accordance with the first embodiment can be carried out only one by one; therefore, this encryption/decryption method is very powerful.

Meanwhile, the public key size and the encryption key size of
5 each entity in accordance with the first embodiment are given as follows.

public key size: $J K^2 k$ bits

encryption key size of each entity: $K^2 k$ bits

Since the message has been encoded at the beginning of a
10 cryptographic communication, the following condition (23) is required according to the above-mentioned conditions (9), (18), and hence, the rate (information transmission rate) becomes less than 1.

$$J < 2^k \quad \dots (23)$$

However, in case that the selected keys are fixed during a
15 predetermined time duration or during the data transmission of a predetermined amount of data, the above-mentioned condition (23) is unnecessary, and hence, the rate becomes approximately 1.

Specific numerical examples are described below.

<Numerical example 1>

20 In a rather large-scale case of $k=16$, $K=1024$, and $J=1024$, the public key size is $2^{10} \cdot 2^{20} \cdot 2^4 = 2^{34}$ bits ≈ 2.147 Gbytes, and the encryption key size of each entity is 2.0 kbytes.

<Numerical example 2>

25 In a rather small-scale case of $k=8$, $K=128$, and $J=128$, the public key size is 2.097 Mbytes, and the encryption key size of each

entity is 16.384 kbytes.

<Numerical example 3>

In case of $k=16$, $K=128$, and $J=128$, the public key size is 4.19 Mbytes, and the encryption key size of each entity is 32.8 kbytes.

5 The principal operation for encryption is a product-sum operation of 128 elements of F_q ($q=2^{16}$) (for example, carried out in seven steps by a 128 parallel processing). The principal operations for decryption are a multiplicative and divisional operation of a polynomial of degree 128 on F_q ($q=2^{16}$) and 128 successive multiplicative and

10 divisional operations of a polynomial of degree one on F_q ($q=2^{16}$).

<Numerical example 4>

In case of $k=8$, $K=32$, and $J=16$, the public key size is 16.4 kbytes, and the encryption key size of each entity is 1.02 kbytes.

The principal operation for encryption is a product-sum operation of

15 32 elements of F_q ($q=2^8$) (for example, carried out in five steps by a 32 parallel processing). The principal operations for decryption are a multiplicative and divisional operation of a polynomial of degree 32 on F_q ($q=2^8$) and 32 successive multiplicative and divisional operations of a polynomial of degree one on F_q ($q=2^8$).

20 The rate and the improvement thereof in the second example are described below. Since the degree of the secret polynomial $P(X)$ is $K+1$, input plaintext length L_M and output ciphertext length L_C are given by the following (24) and (25), respectively, and further, rate r is given by the following (26).

25
$$L_M = K k \quad \dots (24)$$

$$L_C = (K+1) k \cdots (25)$$

$$r = K / (K+1) \cdots (26)$$

Let us consider a condition necessary for the rate r to be completely 1. Assume that the bases $b_1^{(j)}$ in the class 1 are all 5 constant terms alone, that is, $b_1^{(j)} = \alpha_1^{(j)}$. In this case, the following (27) is assumed to be satisfied. Further, vector $P(w_1^{(j)}, w_2^{(j)}, \dots, w_K^{(j)})$ is deduced by randomly permutating the components of the coefficient vector $(w_1^{(j)}, w_2^{(j)}, \dots, w_K^{(j)})$, and designated to subkeys of the class 1 of the public key list.

$$10 \quad \alpha_1^{(j)} w(X) = w_1^{(j)} + w_2^{(j)} X + w_3^{(j)} X^2 + \dots + w_K^{(j)} X^{K-1} \cdots (27)$$

Even in this case, as long as $K \gg 1$, a trial-and-error attack to the $P(w_1^{(j)}, w_2^{(j)}, \dots, w_K^{(j)})$ is still practically impossible.

Therefore, input plaintext length L_M , output ciphertext 15 length L_C , and rate r are given by the following (28), (29), and (30), respectively.

$$L_M = K k \cdots (28)$$

$$L_C = K k \cdots (29)$$

$$r = 1 \cdots (30)$$

20 (Second embodiment: a product-sum type cryptography using error correcting code on a finite field)

FIG. 4 is a schematic diagram showing a situation that an encryption method/decryption method in accordance with the second embodiment is used in an informational communication 25 between two entities a, b. Similarly to the FIG. 1, also in the

example of FIG. 4, an entity a encrypts a plaintext M into a ciphertext C, thereby transmitting the ciphertext C through a communication channel 1 to the other entity b. The entity b decrypts the ciphertext C into the original plaintext M.

5 The entity a of sender comprises: a plaintext divider 2 for dividing a plaintext M into a plurality of divided plaintexts; and an encryptor 3 for generating a ciphertext C using public keys and divided plaintexts. On the other hand, the entity b of recipient comprises a decryptor 4 for decrypting the transmitted ciphertext C
 10 into the original plaintext M. In the second embodiment, similarly to the first embodiment, secret keys, public keys, random numbers, and the like are expressed in a polynomial representation, whereby a product-sum type cryptosystem is constituted on a finite field.

(Encryption)

15 Secret keys and public keys are prepared as follows.

• Secret keys: { $X^a g_i(X)$ }, $w(X)$, $P(X)$

• Public keys: { $C_i(X)$ }, encoding parameters for m

Let a code polynomial on F_2 of degree g_i be $g_i(X)$. However, $g_i = g$ (constant) is assumed herein for the simplicity of description.

20 With $P(X)$ being an appropriately selected, secret polynomial, the following (31) is deduced. Here, $a_i = a$ (constant) is assumed similarly to the above-mentioned g_i .

$$X^{a_i} g_i(X) w(X) \equiv C_i(X) \pmod{P(X)} \quad \dots \quad (31)$$

25 Encryption is carried out as shown in the following (32).

$$C(X) = \sum_{i=1}^k m'_i(X) C_i(X) \quad \dots (32)$$

(Decryption)

5 [First decryption example of the second embodiment]

By using a secret polynomial $w^{-1}(X)$ satisfying the following (33), an intermediate decrypted text $M(X)$ is deduced as shown in the following (34). More specifically, the intermediate decrypted text $M(X)$ is obtained as shown in the following (35).

10 $w(X) w^{-1}(X) \equiv 1 \pmod{P(X)} \quad \dots (33)$

$M(X) \equiv C(X) w^{-1}(X) \pmod{P(X)} \quad \dots (34)$

$$M(X) = g_1(X) m'_1(X) + g_2(X) m'_2(X) X^a \\ + \dots + g_k(X) m'_k(X) X^{(K-1)a} \quad \dots (35)$$

15 In the above, the degree p of the secret polynomial $P(X)$ is set to be larger by 1 than the degree of the right-hand side of the above-mentioned (35). Then, p satisfies the following condition (36).

$p = g + k + (K-1)a + 1 \quad \dots (36)$

20 Let $S_a(w)$ indicate the operation of sampling the lowest n digits of the vector w , and let the sampled series be expressed by a polynomial $S_w(X)$. Then, the following (a), (b) hold.

(a): In a series $S_w(X)$ sampled from the intermediate decrypted text $M(X)$ given by the above-mentioned (35), when $a < g + k = n$, the end $e_1(X)$ of length $(g + k - a)$ of the second term is in

an additional form as shown in the following (37).

$$g_1(X) m_1(X) + e_1(X) X^a \quad \dots (37)$$

(b): Let the degree of the end $e_1(X)$ be $(e-1)$. Then, in case that $g \geq e$, the $e_1(X)$ is correctable as a disappearance error.

5 According to (a), (b), the $e_1(X) X^a$ in $S_w(X)$ can be corrected as a disappearance error. Therefore, $g_1(X) m_1(X)$ can be decrypted, whereby $m_1(X)$ can be easily decrypted. That is, each term of the intermediate decrypted text has a form of product-sum component plus noise component. However, since the product-sum component
10 is an error correcting code word, the noise component can be corrected as an error by the error correction capability thereof, whereby the product-sum component can be decrypted purely and accurately. The subsequent terms can be decrypted similarly to the first term. As such, in the first decryption example, decryption
15 is performed sequentially from the lowest order term in ascending order.

[Second decryption example of the second embodiment]

By using a secret polynomial $w^{-1}(X)$ satisfying the following (38), an intermediate decrypted text $M(X)$ is deduced as shown in
20 the following (39). More specifically, the intermediate decrypted text $M(X)$ is obtained as shown in the following (40).

$$w(X) w^{-1}(X) \equiv 1 \pmod{P(X)} \quad \dots (38)$$

$$M(X) \equiv C(X) w^{-1}(X) \pmod{P(X)} \quad \dots (39)$$

$$M(X) = g_1(X) m_1'(X) + g_2(X) m_2'(X) X^a + \dots + g_K(X) m_K'(X) X^{(K-1)a} \quad \dots (40)$$

The following (c), (d) hold.

(c): In a series $S_w(X)$ sampled from the intermediate decrypted text $M(X)$ given by the above-mentioned (40), when $a < g + k = n$, the $e_{K-1}(X)$ of the higher order $(g + k - a)$ digits of the 5 second term $g_{K-1}(X) m_{K-1}(X)$ is in an additional form as shown in the following (41).

$$g_K(X) m_K'(X) + e_{K-1}(X) X^a \dots (41)$$

(d): Let the degree of the $e_{K-1}(X)$ be $(e-1)$. Then, in case that $g \geq e$, the $e_{K-1}(X)$ is correctable as a disappearance error. 10 According to (c), (d), the $e_{K-1}(X)$ in $S_w(X)$ can be corrected as a disappearance error. Therefore, $g_K(X) m_K'(X)$ can be decrypted, whereby $m_K'(X)$ can be easily decrypted. As such, in the second decryption example, decryption is performed sequentially from the highest order term in descending order.

15 Meanwhile, in this second embodiment, similarly to the above-mentioned first embodiment, a scheme can be used such that public keys are arbitrarily selected. When such a scheme is applied to the first example of the first embodiment, let $g_i(X)$ belong to a class i ; J pieces of $g_i(X)$ are prepared for each class except for 20 the class 1; m_1 is decoded from the $m_1(X)$ decrypted in the class 1; and the public key selection information in the class 2 can be obtained similarly. When such a scheme is applied to the second example of the first embodiment, let $g_i(X)$ belong to a class i ; J pieces of $g_i(X)$ are prepared for each class except for the classes K, K 25 $- 1$; m_K is decoded from the $m_K(X)$ decrypted in the class K ; and the

public key selection information in the class K-2 can be obtained similarly.

FIG. 5 is a diagram showing the configuration of an embodiment of a memory product in accordance with the present invention. The program illustrated here contains an encryption process or a decryption process in accordance with the first embodiment or the second embodiment described above, and further is recorded in a memory product described below. A computer 20 is provided in each entity.

10 In FIG. 5, a memory product 21 is composed of, for example, a server computer on the WWW (World Wide Web) installed apart from the installed location of the computer 20. In the memory product 21, a program 21a described above is recorded. The program 21a read out from the memory product 21 via a transmission medium 24 such as a communication line controls the computer 20 so as to generate a ciphertext from a plaintext or decrypt a ciphertext into a plaintext.

15 A memory product 22 provided in the interior of the computer 20 is composed of a disk drive, a ROM, or the like built in. 20 In the memory product 22, a program 22a described above is recorded. The program 22a read out from the memory product 22 controls the computer 20 so as to generate a ciphertext from a plaintext or decrypt a ciphertext into a plaintext.

25 A memory product 23 used in the loaded state into a disk drive 20a provided in the computer 20 is composed of a

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magneto-optical disk, a CD-ROM, a flexible disk, or the like portable. In the memory product 23, a program 23a described above is recorded. The program 23a read out from the memory product 23 controls the computer 20 so as to generate a ciphertext 5 from a plaintext or decrypt a ciphertext into a plaintext.

As described above, in the present invention, since a product-sum type cryptosystem is constituted on a finite field, the cryptosystem is more resistive to attacks by LLL algorithm than a product-sum type cryptosystem on an integer ring, thereby 10 improving the security.

Further, each term of the intermediate decrypted texts is constituted of an error correcting code word, whereby the original plaintext can be reproduced accurately by the correction capability of the code word even if an error of a certain extent occurs.

15 Furthermore, a plurality of public keys are previously prepared for each of divided plaintexts generated by dividing a plaintext. For each of the divided plaintexts, an arbitrary public key is selected from among the prepared plurality of public keys, whereby a ciphertext is generated by using the selected public keys. 20 As a result, one can arbitrarily select the public keys to generate a ciphertext. Accordingly, the manner of the public key selection is unknown to attackers, which makes attacks difficult thereby to improve the security further.

As this invention may be embodied in several forms without 25 departing from the spirit of essential characteristics thereof, the

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present embodiment is therefore illustrative and not restrictive, since the scope of the invention is defined by the appended claims rather than by the description preceding them, and all changes that fall within metes and bounds of the claims, or equivalent of such
5 metes and bounds thereof are therefore intended to be embraced by the claims.